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FEDERAL COURTS AND ATTORNEY
DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS: A REALISTIC
APPROACH TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The motion to disqualify an adversary's attorney has become the newest
weapon in a litigator's motion arsenal.1 Disqualification motions alleging
conflicts of interest can result in a great advantage to the movant by denying
the opposition their choice of counsel,2 or by delaying the proceedings for
several weeks or months.3 The attractiveness of the attorney disqualifica-
tion motion as a strategic weapon is enhanced by the failure of the courts to
impose sanctions against attorneys who bring frivolous disqualification
motions. 4
This Comment examines the treatment in federal courts of motions made
to disqualify an adversary attorney5 and the relevant rules of professional
responsibility.6 The examination reveals that disproportionate weight is
given to the possibility of divulgence of client confidences as compared to
the harms suffered by the party whose attorney is disqualified. This
disproportionate weighing results from the restrictiveness of the present
rules of professional responsibility. The present imbalance of interests
would be lessened by stricter requirements for standing and greater consid-
eration of the good faith of motions. In some instances, modification of the
rules of professional responsibility and increased sanctions by the courts
are needed. In lieu of changes in the rules of professional responsibility or
1. See Bayer & Abrahams, The Ethics of Moving for Disqualification of Opposing Counsel, 13
CoO. LAW. 55, 55 (1984); Lerner, Motions to Disqualify Opposing Counsel: Eliminating the
Gamesmanship, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1984, at 5 & 15, coLI. 1.
2. See Judge Coffey's dissent in Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1275 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J. dissenting) (noting that disqualification of a party's attorney deprives the
individual of representation of the attorney of his choice; it may be difficult if not impossible for a new
attorney to master "the nuances of the legal and factual matters" late in the litigation of a complex case).
3. E.g., Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc., 680 F.2d 895, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (an unsuccessful disqualifica-
tion motion caused a nine-month delay); INA Underwriters Ins. v. Nalibotsky, 594 F. Supp. 1199, 1201
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (the motion was made June 15, 1984, and after numerous briefs and affidavits and two
days of evidentiary hearings, the decision was made August 27, 1984).
4. Comment, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L.
Rv. 1244, 1497-98 (1981).
5. Interpreting federal court cases is sometimes difficult because while the district courts tend to
adopt the rules of professional responsibility applicable to the state courts, such adoption is not
required. See O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered: MethodsforAvoiding Conflicts of
Interest, Malpractice Liability, and Disqualification, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 693, 696-97 (1980).
6. This article concerns only attorney disqualification in the federal courts, however, because in
every state except Maine and Mississippi the Model Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct have been given the force of law, the vast majority of federal district
courts refer to the code either as promulgated by the American Bar Association or as adopted in their
state. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1248-49.
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the federal courts' treatment of disqualification motions, law firms must
take steps to lessen exposure to allegations of conflicts of interest. In
addition to avoiding conflicts of interest by careful scrutiny of potential
clients and employees, the implementation of screening mechanisms may
prevent vicarious disqualification of the entire firm if a single attorney
within the firm is disqualified. Without action by the law firm to limit its
exposure to conflicts of interest, disqualification motions can be used to
impede the firm's effectiveness.
I. DISQUALIFICATION FOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
A. Federal Courts and Rules of Professional Responsibility
Historically, the bases for disqualification motions in the federal courts
have been violations of the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of
Professional Ethics, 7 the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Model Code"), 8 and most recently the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("RPC"). 9 Federal courts generally adopt local state court rules
governing professional conduct. However, they are not bound to follow
those rules. 10 While the Canons of Professional Ethics were the original
code for professional conduct, the majority of decisions on disqualification
motions now refer to either the Model Code or the newer RPC.
Under the Model Code, disqualification motions may claim a violation
of any one or a combination of three specific canons: Canon 4,11 requiring
7. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS adopted in 1908.
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The canons are
statements of axiomatic norms according to the Model Code's Preamble. The word "canon," however,
is commonly used to stand for the headline, the corresponding Ethical Considerations and the
Disciplinary Rules that follow the headline. The Disciplinary Rules are considered the teeth of the
Model Code.
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter RPC]. The Model Code and the RPC
have no authority themselves until adopted by the court specifically. The highest state court adopts the
rules for that state's judiciary. The rules adopted by each state court seldom follow the RPC or Model
Code exactly. The following states have adopted, usually with some changes, the RPC: Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, and Washington. NATIONAL REPORT ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(April 1987). Also, the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals has petitioned the high court to adopt the RPC with some changes.
10. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 986 (1973). It is the duty of the district court to examine charges of violation of an attorney's
ethical responsibility because it is that court which is authorized to supervise the conduct of the
members of its bar. Such regulation of attorneys appearing before the district court will be disturbed
only when the court has abused its discretion. Id. at 1385-86.
1I. In Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) confidences and secrets are specifically defined. "Confidence"
refers to information protected by the attomey-client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers
to other information that would be likely to be detrimental to the client. MODEL CODE, DR 4- 101(A).
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Disqualification Motions
attorneys to preserve the confidences of their clients; Canon 5,12 con-
cerning the loyalty attorneys owe their clients; and Canon 9,13 admonishing
the attorney to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 14 Motions
brought under the RPC generally address its corresponding sections, 15
Rule 1.6,16 Rule 1.7,17 and Rule 1.9.18
The Model Code and the RPC differ in two significant ways that impact
disqualification motions. First, the provision relating to vicarious dis-
qualification in the Model Code, DR 5-101(D), 19 is narrower in scope than
the comparable provision in the newer RPC, Rule 1.10.20 Second, the RPC
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B) adds that a lawyer shall not reveal, use to client's disadvantage or use for
advantage to himself or of a third person any confidences or secrets, unless the client consents after full
disclosure. MODEL CODE, DR 4-101(B).
12. Canon 5 reads, "[a] lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client." MODEL CODE, Canon 5. The Canon's Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) states that a lawyer shall
decline employment if his independent professional judgment will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the employment. MODEL CODE, DR 5-105(A).
13. The disciplinary rules under Canon 9 state that a lawyer shall not accept employment in a
matter he has acted on in a judicial capacity, or employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility as a public employee. MODEL CODE, DR 9-101(A)-(C).
14. The framers of the RPC abandoned Canon 9 after it had been denounced by academic
commentators and found to be "simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order
except in the rarest cases." Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 E2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
15. There is no RPC rule corresponding to Canon 9.
16. "A lawyer shall not'reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation .... " RPC Rule 1.6.
17. RPC Rule 1.7 states that a lawyer shall not represent a client if such representation will be
adverse to another client unless he believes that the representation will not adversely affect the other
client and each client consents. It adds that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation may
be limited by responsibilities to another unless the lawyer believes the representation will not be
adversely affected and the client consents after a consultation that explains the implications of common
representation. RPC Rule 1.7.
18. RPC Rule 1.9 states that a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent, in the same or a substantially related matter, a person whose interests are adverse to the
former client's unless the former client consents after consultation. Nor shall the lawyer use information
relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit or
when the information has become generally known. RPC Rule 1.9.
19. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) notes that if a lawyer is required to decline employment or to
withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm may accept or continue such employment. MODEL CODE, DR 5-105(D).
20. Much more detailed and, therefore, possibly more restrictive than the Model Code Rule, RPC
Rule 1. 10 starts with the basic premise of DR 5-101(D) that while lawyers are associated in a firm, none
of them shall represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing
so. But it adds that when a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not represent a person
whose interests are adverse to any of the new attorney's or new attorney's former firm's clients if the
representation involves the same or a substantially related matter and the new lawyer had acquired
information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b). Wanting to provide for all contingencies, Rule 1. 10 adds
that when a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter
representing a person adverse to a client represented by the former lawyer unless: One, The matter is the
same or substantially related to the former representation; and two, any lawyer remaining in the firm has
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has a section which allows screening of government attorneys, RPC Rule
1.11.21
The framers of the RPC included Rule 1.11, Successive Government and
Private Employment, which authorized the limited use of screening mecha-
nisms. 22 RPC 1.11 begins with an overall restriction that an attorney cannot
represent a private client in a matter in which that attorney "personally and
substantially" participated as a public officer unless the government
agency consents. 23 The entire firm, however, need not necessarily be
disqualified if the conflicted attorney is screened from participation in the
matter, receives no fee from it, and written notice is given the government
agency. 24 It is not required that the government agency approve such
representation. 25
B. Disqualification Based on Conflicts of Interest
The proof of violations based on an alleged conflict of interest begins by
establishing that a prior attorney-client relationship existed which is the
basis of the present conflict of interest. 26 A movant can then establish a
violation by showing concurrent representation by a single firm, a firm
representing a client with interests adverse to a former client, or a single
attorney changing employment.
information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b). A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived
by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. RPC Rule 1.10.
21. See infra note 23.
22. Screening mechanisms are also known as Chinese Walls.
23. RPC Rule 1.11 begins with an admonition that, except as the law may otherwise expressly
permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate
government agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in that lawyer's firm may undertake or
continue representation in such a matter unless the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participa-
tion in the matter, is apportioned no part of the fee, and written notice is given to the appropriate
government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. The rule also
covers cases involving former representation noting that a lawyer having confidential government
information about a person may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person
in matters in which the information could be used against him. Neither may anyone in the lawyer's firm
undertake such representation unless the former government attorney is screened from any participation
in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee. RPC Rule 1.11.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1311-21(7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978), Westinghouse alleged that no conflict could exist because there was no
attorney-client relationship between the Westinghouse attorneys and the appellants. The court found
that an attorney-client relationship did exist because the Westinghouse firm represented an association
which included several of the appellants in its membership.
Disqualification Motions
1. Concurrent Representation
The concurrent representation of two adversaries, a violation of Canons
5 and 9 or RPC 1.6 and 1.7, presents the strongest case for disqualifica-
tion.27 All courts consider the simultaneous representation of adverse
parties as constituting a conflict of interest worthy of disqualification. 28 The
possibility of divided loyalty is so abhorrent to most courts that even though
the parties have agreed to the concurrent representation, the court may not
allow it.29 When faced with the possibility of divided loyalty the court will
disqualify a conflicted attorney on a motion brought by an adversary even if
the conflict is between co-parties who have consented to the joint represen-
tation.30 Standing can be granted to any party associated with the case.31
The moving party need not show that he or she is adversely affected by the
joint representation. 32
2. Representation of a Client Whose Interests Are Adverse to a Former
Client
Second only to concurrent representation of adversary parties as a basis
for granting disqualification is the case where the entire firm has switched
sides. 33 A firm that previously represented one party now seeks to represent
27. C. WOLFRAM, MoDaERN LEGAL ETtIcs 351-52 (1986). In Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.,
528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated that even when the relationship between the
litigations is remote, the relevant test is one of prima facie impropriety instead of the substantial
relationship test employed in former client conflict cases.
28. See Woodruffv. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 935-37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 1321-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 955 (1978); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 350.
In determining whether Canon 5 loyalty issues are involved, the court looks to the status of the
attorney and the adversaries at the time the complaint was filed. To do otherwise would mean that the
firm could convert a present client into a former client merely by seeking to withdraw as counsel after
the complaint is filed. Ransburg Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., No. 86-C-103, slip op. at 12 (N.D.
Ill. July 1, 1986).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465
U.S. 259 (1984). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying joint counsel for criminal
defendants where conflict of interest was likely to arise even though it found that each defendant was
completely aware of potential conflicts of joint representation and had chosen to waive any claim of
conflict of interest. Id. at 1073, 1076.
30. See, e.g., Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 87, 89 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (co-defendants who had
consented to joint representation were ordered to obtain separate counsel upon motion by the plaintiff).
31. See generally Greene, Everybody's Doing It-But Who Should Be? Standing to Make a
Disqualification Motion Based on an Attorney's Representation of a Client with Interests Adverse to
Those of a Former Client, 6 U. PuGET SouND L. REV. 205, 205 (1983).
32. See generally Estates Theatres, Inc. v. ColumbiaPictures Ind., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Black v. Missouri, 492 F Supp. 848, 861-62 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1983);
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the former client's adversary. The entire firm switching sides is considered
to be in violation of Canon 4, which states that an attorney shall not use the
confidences of his clients against that client,34 and Canon 9, which forbids
the appearance of impropriety.35 Under the RPC such actions by the firm
violate Rule 1.6,36 which is similar to Canon 4, and Rule 1.9, which
protects former clients. 37
The only successful defense to this type of motion is a finding that the
two representations are not "substantially related." 38 While federal courts
vary in their definitions of substantially related, 39 the majority look to both
the purpose of the representation 40 and the underlying facts that necessi-
tated such representation. 41 If either the present factual pattern is substan-
tially related to a previous representation or the purpose for the representa-
tion is the same, disqualification is frequently granted. 42 It is not necessary
for the movant to show specifically what confidences were divulged during
the previous representation. 43 The courts presume that an attorney receives
Ransburg Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., No. 86-C-103, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1986); Clark
v. Imarfiex Mfg. Co., No. 85-C-8184, slip op. at 2 (N.D. III. Jan. 3, 1986).
34. See supra note 11.
35. Disqualification cases involving government attorneys are often dealt with exclusively under
Canon 9 because Canons 4 and 5 are premised upon the existence of an attorney-client relationship. See,
e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 435, 442 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Wagner v. Lehman Bros., Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 643, 645,
655, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (a former attorney for the SEC signed off a file on the defendant, three days
later joined a firm representing the plaintiff and called up his contacts at the SEC to get the file on the
defendant re-opened).
36. See supra note 16.
37. See supra notes 11, 18.
38. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
39. The Seventh Circuit uses a three-step test formulated in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978):
Initially, the trial judge must make a factual reconstruction of the scope of the prior legal
representation. Second, it must be determined whether it is reasonable to infer that the confidential
information allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer representing a client in those
matters. Finally, it must be determined whether that information is relevant to the issues raised in
the litigation pending against the former client.
Id.
40. See, e.g., National Souvenir Center v. Historic Figures, Inc., 728 F.2d 503, 517-18 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, 501 F. Supp.
326, 328-29 (D.D.C. 1980).
41. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 256 (7th Cir. 1983).
42. See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985) (a substantial relationship
warranting disqualification exists if factual contexts are related).
43. Examination of the attorney-client relationship would necessarily compromise confidentiality
and therefore should not be required to prove a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD
Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1983); Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1052 (2d Cir.
1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978); United States Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp.
1448, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1985): Fuente v. Honegerrs & Co., No. 83-C-61, slip. op. at 7 (N.D. I11. April 17,
1985).
868
Disqualification Motions
confidences as part of the attorney-client relationship.44 In the case where
an entire firm has switched sides and the present litigation is substantially
related to the previous representation, the party seeking to defeat the
disqualification motion is not allowed to rebut the presumption that the
attorneys received confidences in their former employment. 45 Federal
courts have concluded that if the attorney-client relationship existed the
firm must have received confidential information. 46
3. Single Attorneys Changing Employment
The disqualification decision most likely to be appealed is of a third type,
a single attorney changing employment. 47 Again parties allege violations
of Canons 4 and 9 or RPC 1.6 and 1.7 because the attorney possesses
confidential information gained in an attorney-client relationship and is
now in a position to use that information against the former firm's client. 48
As in the case of a firm representing an adversary of a former client, the
court determines whether the present litigation involves a matter substan-
tially related to the prior representation. 49 Unlike an instance where the
entire firm has switched sides, some federal courts have allowed rebuttal of
the presumption that the attorney who changed employment received a
particular client's confidences during his former employment.5s The larger
and more departmentalized the attorney's former firm, the greater the
likelihood that the presumption of received confidences will be suc-
cessfully rebutted and the disqualification motion denied.5' Many federal
44. See Smith, 757 F.2d at 1100. The court agreed with the Fifth, Ninth, Eighth, Second and First
Circuits that the presumption that the client revealed facts to his attorney is irrebuttable. Id.
45. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263,1267 (7th Cir. 1983). Even if there is
a substantial relationship between the two matters, the lawyer can avoid disqualification by showing that
effective measures were taken to prevent confidences from being received by whichever lawyers in the
new firm were handling the new matter. "The exception is applicable here; the firm itself changed
sides." Id.
46. NCK Org. Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Standard
Oil, 136 F. Supp. 345, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
47. E.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098,1099 (10th Cir. 1985); EZPaintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc.,
746 F.2d 1459, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng., Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d
435, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 716-17 (7th
Cir. 1982); Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 639 F.2d 749,750-51 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 434-36 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981).
48. Under the RPC this would potentially violate Rule 1.9. For the text of this rule, see supra note
18.
49. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
50. E.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715,723 (7th Cir. 1982).
51. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir.
1975). In Silver Chrysler Plymouth, the court denied disqualification of an attorney who was formerly
with the firm that represented Chrysler. This firm had 30 partners and 50 associates. The court said it
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courts, however, do not allow rebuttal of the presumption of received
confidences, 52 even when the attorney in question did not work directly
with the adverse party at the old firm. 53
If a court finds a single attorney within a firm should be disqualified, a
movant may obtain vicarious disqualification of the entire firm by applying
DR 5-105(D) of the Model Code54 or RPC Rule 1.10. 55 The reasoning
behind these rules is that the conflicted attorney will share potentially
damaging information, received in confidence during the previous employ-
ment, with new co-workers. 56 Most federal courts have held that a movant
does not have to prove that any sharing of information actually occurred. 57
Any other position would conceivably make the movant's task impossible
since the moving party is not privy to the communications of his advers-
ary's attorney. 58
Even in federal courts where, as a general rule, the presumption of
shared confidences is not rebuttable, 59 in cases involving a government
attorney moving to the private sector, these courts have sometimes allowed
rebuttal of the presumption. Rebuttal is possible if the conflicted attorney
was screened from the attorneys involved in the present litigation. 60 Courts
would be absurd to conclude that upon entry to the firm the new associates became recipients of
knowledge as to the names of all the firm's clients and the contents of the files relating to them. Id. at
753-54.
52. "Received confidences" refer to the knowledge of a client's secrets and confidences that an
attorney learned during his previous employment. "Shared confidences" refer to those client's secrets
and confidences that the attorney revealed to his new colleagues.
53. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,571 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Uzzi,
549 F Supp. 979,981,985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380,
386 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612
F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
54. See supra note 19.
55. See supra note 20.
56. This presumption is different from the presumption that an attorney who represents a client
acquires actual knowledge of the client's confidences discussed in notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
The courts often refer to actual knowledge because of the nearly universal view that the presumption is
irrebuttable. See, e.g., NovoTerapeutisk Lab. A/S v. BaxterTravenol Labs, Inc., 607 F.2d 186,197 (7th
Cir. 1979) (en banc).
The second presumption holds that an attorney having "actual knowledge" of a client's confidences
shares that knowledge with all the other lawyers in his or her firm. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods.
Co., 603 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim
Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) (en bane).
57. Courts deduce from their knowledge of the working relationship of attorneys within a firm that
the free flow of information is encouraged and no limits are put on the sharing of client confidences
within the firm. Disqualification is required to guard against the possibility of inadvertent use of
confidential information. See In Re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 922 (E.D. Va. 1981).
58. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp. 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
59. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
60. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Cl. Ct. 1977). One of the attorneys representing
870
Disqualification Motions
have been persuaded by the public policy concerns underlying ABA
Formal Opinion 342 and the adoption of RPC Rule 1.1161 that screening to
prevent vicarious disqualification of firms hiring former government attor-
neys is justified. 62 The ABA has argued that if such screening were not
allowed, it would be nearly impossible to recruit attorneys into government
service. 63 Government attorneys seeking to move to the private sector
would be greatly constricted in their choice of employment by potential
conflicts of interest and would be unable to use the specialized knowledge
gained during government employment. 64
Beginning with the Seventh Circuit in 1983,65 federal courts have ex-
tended this reasoning to allow rebuttal of the presumption of shared
confidences through screening when a private attorney changes from one
private firm to another. 66 A screening defense, however, has been limited to
cases involving successive representation, rather than simultaneous repre-
sentation of adverse interests.67 Furthermore, whether the movement in-
volves government-to-private or private-to-private employment changes,
courts have required that stringent timing requirements for the screening
Kesselhaut once served as a general counsel to the Federal Housing Authority (FHA). The United
States, therefore, sought to disqualify both this particular attorney and his law firm after Kesselhaut
brought suit regarding FHA related taxes. Although disqualifying the conflicted attorney, the court
refused to disqualify the other members of the firm. Id. at 792; see also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625
F.2d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
61. See supra note 23 for the text of Rule 1.11.
62. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 342 (1976), reprinted in 62
A.B.A.L 517 (1976).
63. Id. at518.
64. Id. at 518-19.
65. For a detailed analysis of the decisions on disqualification motions in the Seventh Circuit, see
Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh Circuit Approach to
Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 399, 401-11 (1984); Talley,
Toward Chinese Walls: The Seventh Circuit Debates Rebuttable Presumptions in Vicarious Dis-
qualification Cases, 11 S. IiL. U. L.L 59, 64-85 (1986).
66. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983) (an individual lawyer allegedly received
confidential communications from the defendant and later joined the firm representing the plaintiff but
was not involved in the litigation). The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erroneously applied
an irrebuttable presumption but upheld the disqualification of the entire firm because "no evidence
exists in the record establishing that the [challenged firm] has 'institutional mechanisms' in effect
insulating [the conflicted attorney] from all participation in and information about [the] case." Id. at
421.
See also Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying
Seventh Circuit law the court refused to recognize secondary imputation of confidences and allowed
representation to continue if the conflicted attorney was screened); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,757 (2d Cir. 1975); Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308,
1310 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (the presumption of sharing, if one arises under these facts in the Fifth Circuit,
"has been clearly and effectively rebutted").
67. Screening is not thought of as an adequate device when the conflict of interest includes a
potential conflict of loyalties. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
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process be met. 68 If the conflicted attorney has not been screened from the
very beginning of the association with the new firm, successful rebuttal of
the presumption of shared confidences is unlikely. 69 If the timing require-
ment is met and the screening is adequate, the court may allow continued
representation even when a member of a firm currently involved in litiga-
tion joins the opposing party's firm. 70
II. PROBLEMS IN THE DISQUALIFICATION PROCESS
A. Harms Created by Disqualification
The major problem with the current conflict of interest rules is that the
alleged conflict of interest may not merit the hardship created by dis-
qualification of chosen counsel. 71 Having been denied their choice of
counsel, the parties to the litigation must find competent replacement
counsel. 72 New counsel must attempt to attain the same level of knowledge
in the litigation as the prior counsel. 73 If the litigation has progressed for a
lengthy period of time, it could take several months before the counsel is
competent. In cases involving a long term relationship, complex litigation
or a series of on-going litigations and settlements, a standard of proficiency
equal to that of the disqualified counsel may never be attained. 74
68. See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stevens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983) (screening not in place when
attorney who actively represented one of the defendants joined the plaintiff's counsel's firm); LaSalle
Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 259 (7th Cir. 1983) (conflicted attorney joined firm in
February, screened in August, entire firm disqualified).
69. Schiessle v. Stevens, 717 F.2d 417,421 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake,
703 F.2d 252, 259 (7th Cir. 1983). But see Panduit v. All States Plastics Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (allowing screening to prevent disqualification six months after the attorney joined the
firm); United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr., 637 F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (W.D. Wash.
1986).
70. LawyerRemains In Case Despite Mid-Stream Switch, Legal Times, May 10, 1982, at 2, col. 1.
71. Disqualification "is a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when
absolutely necessary." Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715,721 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. See infra note 117.
73. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982). The Freeman court
stated that:
[W]e also note that disqualification, as a prophylactic device for protecting the attorney-client
relationship, is a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely
necessary. A disqualification of counsel, while protecting the attorney-client relationship, also
serves to destroy a relationship by depriving a party of representation of their own choosing ....
We do not mean to infer [sic] that motions to disqualify counsel may not be legitimate, for there
obviously are situations where they are both legitimate and necessary; nonetheless, such motions
should be viewed with extreme caution for-they can be misused as techniques for harassment.
Id. at 721-22.
74. Peterson, supra note 65, at 400-01. "A litigant may impose both psychological hardship, by
requiring his opponent to obtain new counsel with whom he has never worked, and financial hardship,
by requiring his opponent to incur additional fees to allow his new counsel to become familiar with the
litigation." Id.
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The hardship created by disqualification has only rarely been considered
substantial enough to warrant the defeat of a disqualification motion that
has even the most insubstantial basis.75 By making the presumption of
received confidences and the presumption of shared confidences irrebutta-
ble, the courts have protected the former client often to the extreme
detriment of the present client. 76 If indeed no confidential information is
received, or it is so inconsequential as to give rise to little potential harm,
the courts by adhering to these irrebuttable presumptions have prevented a
minor harm to one side by inflicting a major harm, disqualification of
chosen counsel, to the other.77
Though a client who loses an action after a firm has been disqualified
may bring a malpractice suit against the disqualified firm, the effectiveness
of malpractice as a remedy is questionable. Besides proving that the
attorney did not perform adequately in his representation, the client must
also prove that he or she has suffered harm.78 To establish harm, the client
must prove that but for the attorney's misdeeds, the client would have won
the underlying suit.79 This double burden is often insurmountable. 80
B. Disqualification Motions as Strategic Tactics
Attorney disqualification motions are often brought primarily as a strate-
gic tactic. 81 The problems associated with granting unmerited disqualifica-
75. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744F.2d 1564,1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984); United
States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr., 637 F. Supp. 1556, 1562 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
76. Courts frequently point out that the decision to disqualify an attorney does not require a finding
of improper or even morally blameworthy conduct. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528
F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir.
1974).
77. In addition to the loss to the client who must find a new attorney, there is a dual economic loss to
the public: disqualification consumes additional time in the courts at added public expense, and the risk
of disqualification imposes a severe restraint on the client's free choice of legal representation. Note,
Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to a Former Client, 57 Tax. L. REv.
726, 741 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F 397 (4th Cir. 1916); see also Weiss, The
Rising Tide of Legal Malpractice: Spitting Into the Wind?, 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 637,644-45 (1981).
79. See Zilly, Recent Developments in Legal Malpractice Litigation, 6 LrroATION 1, 11 (1981).
80. Most successful attorney malpractice suits revolve around a problem of timing, such as missing
the statute of limitations deadline. The barring of a client's action because of the attorney's negligence
in meeting the filing deadline is one of the few objective rather than subjective errors an attorney can
make. In the case of malpractice suits involving subjective decisions by attorneys on possible conflicts
of interest, proving that these decisions were negligent is difficult enough; proving that because of this
negligence the client lost his case is nearly impossible. Id.
81. Several commentators have noted the strategic use of disqualification motions. See, e.g., Hodes
& Gabinet, The Ethics ofDisqualifyingAttorneysfor Strategic Reasons, 193 N.Y.L.J., April 18, 1985,
at 1, coL. 4; Lauter, TacticalDisqualificationMotionsMayIncrease, 7 Nat'l L.J., July 1, 1985, at 5, col.
1; Lerner, supra note 1, at 1.
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tion motions are aggravated by the tremendous increase in the number of
motions brought. 82 The increase is due largely to changes in the work
place. 83 Attorneys change jobs more often. Greater movement occurs both
between private firms and from the government to the private sector.
Specialization has, in complex areas of business and litigation, resulted in
more individuals being called upon to "represent" a client, thus increasing
chances of conflicts of interest. 84 Firms are both growing and merging to
provide better service and to increase their competitiveness in the mar-
ketplace. 85 This also leads to additional conflicts. 86
The epidemic of disqualification motions is furthered by law firms that
ignore potential conflict problems when the monetary benefits are great
enough.87
Because the federal courts generally do not sanction attorneys for viola-
tions resulting in successful disqualification motions, the potentially inher-
ent risks in ignoring conflicts are significantly lessened. 88 The gamble is
that the firm will lose money, not that an attorney with the firm will be
disbarred. 89
Although courts may issue sanctions against extreme abuses of conflicts
of interest, 90 courts are likely to label frivolous disqualification motions as
82. A Lexis search in the GENFED library, COURTS file of "disqualif! w/10 counselor attorney or
lawyer and date" from 1960 to 1970 showed 178 cases found. The same search for 1970 to 1980 brought
up 612 cases. For the years 1980 to May 15, 1987, the number was 1120. Although some cases brought
up by this search are inapplicable, the ratio of inapplicable cases to the total number of cases should
remain the same for each time frame. Therefore, the proportional increases from time frame to time
frame are unaffected by the inapplicable cases.
83. See generally Heintz, The Economic Future ofLaw Firms; 1984 and Beyond, 67 A.B.A.J. 446,
446-49 (1981) (detailing changes in the legal profession which necessitated the upsurge in firm size and
mergers); Silas, Law Firms Branch Out, 71 A.B.A.J. 44, 44-48 (1985) (detailing the growth of large
firms by opening branch offices in other cities).
84. As of October 1979, there were 11 American law firms with more than 200 attorneys and 38
with more than 150. National Law Firm Survey, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1979, at 28-33. As of September
1986, there were 91 firms with more than 200 attorneys and 137 with more than 150.9th AnnualSurvey
of Nation's Largest Law Firms, 9 Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at S2-S16.
85. See B. CURRAN, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFES-
SION IN 1985, 4 (1986) (noting that while 11.7% of all attorneys work in firms with 51 or more attorneys,
14.4% of all attorneys under age 39 work in large firms); Adams, Merge? 'Why Not?', 8 Nat'l L.J., June
16, 1986, at 2, col. I (law firm megamerger).
86. See infra note 161.
87. See Hodes & Gabinet, supra note 81, at 1, col. 5.
88. See Comment, supra note 4. Despite the initiation of significant reforms since the ABA
Committee on Disciplinary Enforcement Report, statistics suggest that the disciplinary process fails to
address the entire spectrum of attorney miscorduct. Id. at 1497.
89. One of the reasons disqualification is so often granted is that disciplinary proceedings have not
been an effective sanction. Id. at 1495.
90. Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 66, 70 (1974) ("[flhe overwhelming majority of disciplinary proceedings involve clear
criminal violations").
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abusive only if the motion is brought well after the movant was aware of a
possible conflict of interest situation or when a series of tactics have already
been used to delay the progress of the proceedings. 91 When courts do
recognize abuse, sanctions may include awarding attorneys fees, public
censure, and disbarment from the court. 92 Because such penalties are
almost never imposed,93 sanctions by the federal courts are not an effective
deterrent to unjustified disqualification motions. 94
C. Overemphasis on the Attorney-Client Privilege
The absolute sanctity of client confidences has meant that even the most
attenuated potential harm caused by divulgence of confidences outweighs
the very real harm caused by disqualification. 95 The courts have disallowed
rebuttal of the presumption of shared confidences, strictly following the
conflict of interest rules because of the deference given the attorney-client
privilege. Courts and the profession in general consider the privilege of
paramount importance, to be protected at all costs. 96 Commentators argue
that the absolute sanctity of a client's secrets should be limited.97 Where the
91. Some courts have shown concern that the motion to disqualify not be used as a strategic
litigation tactic. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Smith v. Whatcott,
757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985); Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715,722
(7th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr., 637 F. Supp. 1556, 1562
(W.D. Wash. 1986).
92. Often the judge recognizes that the motions are being used as a strategic weapon but merely
admonishes the movant and does not impose sanctions. See, e.g., Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1979) ("Motions to disqualify an opponent's counsel can easily be
simply disguised harassment.")
93. Moreover, these penalties are likely to be imposed only when a firm knew an extreme conflict of
interest existed and went ahead with the representation anyway. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research,
Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1270 (7th Cir. 1983) (the court upheld a district court decision ordering a law firm
to pay $25,000 in attorney fees and expenses for resisting a disqualification motion where the firm itself
changed sides). For a more complete discussion of sanctions surrounding conflict of interest questions,
see Comment, supra note 4, at 1470-1503.
94. See Smith v. Whatcott, 774 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1985). This was the second motion by plantiff
to disqualify defendants' trial counsel. After granting the first motion, the court was asked to grant a
motion disqualifying the subsequent counsel for having had contact of only one five minute phone call.
Although it did not grant the motion, the court only said this "attempt to raise the issue now resembles
this kind of strategic litigation tactic we cautioned against in our earlier opinion." Id. at 1035.
95. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
96. The profession goes so far as to say that even human life is not valued greater than the keeping of
clients' secrets. Model Code DR 4-101(C) and RPC Rule 1.6 do not mandate that an attorney reveal his
client's secrets when another's life is threatened. They merely allow an attorney to reveal client
confidences if another's life is threatened.MoDEL CODE DR 4-101(C); RPC Rule 1.6.
97. Often the attorney-client privilege is used as a means to help clients lie and conceal the truth
rather than aiding the attorney in preparing a good case for his client. Frankel, The Search for Truth
Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COL. L. REv. 51, 61-65 (1982).
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danger of actual harm caused by shared confidences is minimal, dis-
qualification allows the shield of confidentiality to be used as a sword, often
with the potential for unjust results. 98
D. Restrictiveness of Present Professional Responsibility Rules
Federal courts have been somewhat constrained in resolving dis-
qualification issues by the restrictiveness of both the Model Code and the
RPC. 99 When faced with a motion alleging a conflict of interest, the courts'
objective is to prevent the use of secrets gained in an attorney-client
relationship to the detriment of the former client. 100 Both DR 5-105(D) of
the Model Code 'land RPC Rule 1.10102 adopt hardline positions calling
for the disqualification of an entire firm if any single attorney in that firm is
disqualified. Courts have interpreted the rules as requiring an irrebuttable
presumption of shared confidences except in the case where an attorney has
moved from the government to the private sector. 103 Such a presumption
may be necessary in small law offices consisting of a few general practi-
tioners working in close association on many legal issues. 104 These same
concerns do not necessarily apply to large firms with multiple branch
offices and distinct departments of operation. 105
E. Integrity of the Legal System Undermined
Because disqualification motions involve the actions of an attorney
alleged to be in violation of the profession's ethical rules, the integrity of
98. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 995-1000 (9th Cir. 1980) (despite approval by the court that
the firm be appointed as counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy and considerable work done on the case,
the circuit court overruled the district court and granted disqualification because the firm had some
dealings with one of the creditors); United States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979,981-982 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(a criminal defense firm was disqualified because one of its attorneys had been a member of the
prosecutor's office at the time the defendant was investigated, even though the attorney was not directly
involved in the case and prosecutors have a duty to turn over information favorable to the defense).
99. See supra note 10. From the time they were established by statute in 1789, federal courts had the
power to regulate attorneys appearing before them. See Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531
(1824).
100. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("attorney
disqualification of counsel is a part of a court's duty to safeguard the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-
client relationship which is necessary to maintain public confidence in the legal profession and to
protect the integrity of the judicial process").
101. Seesupra note 19.
102. See supra note 20.
103. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
104. In small firms the presumption of imputed knowledge is more realistic than in large firms. See,
e.g., Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
105. Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts
of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1069 (1964).
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the legal system comes under scrutiny. 106 When a disqualification motion is
made for strategic reasons, an implication arises that attorneys regard
professional ethics as a convenient weapon for litigation rather than as a
means to police the profession. 107 The lack of action by the courts and the
resulting abuse by attorneys, in making bad faith disqualification motions,
further erodes public confidence in a profession with an already tainted
public image. 108
Im. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED
WITH DISQUALIFICATION
A. Stricter Requirements for Standing To Bring a Motion
Standing to raise an issue about conflict of interest between other parties
where the objecting party cannot demonstrate any resulting harm to its own
interests creates a clear danger of tactical use of the motion to disqualify. 109
This tactic impairs the right of jointly represented parties to choose their
own counsel. 110 Some courts argue that they have a broad duty to police the
legal profession, asserting a cognate duty on the part of all advocates to
alert the court to any possible violation of professional rules. I" Denial of
standing, however, merely leaves the general policing of the profession to
disciplinary agencies. 112 Thus, denial of standing in the case of third party
106. See Hodes & Gabinet, supra note 81, at 18, col. 1.
107. See Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 419, 437 (1982) (criticizing the courts reliance on disqualification motions to police attorney
ethical standards).
108. SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFoRCEMENT, ABA, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970). Headed by former Justice Tom Clark, the
committee reported that overall disciplinary efforts have been notoriously inadequate. "With few
exceptions, the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to
outright hostility. Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions .. "Id. at i.
109. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). The defendant moved to disqualify a former Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) attorney's law firm from representing the plaintiff receiver in a lawsuit similar to an
SEC enforcement action against the defendant, despite the fact that the SEC had approved the firm's
representation of the plaintiff. No one challenged the defendant's standing to make the motion (which
was ultimately denied). Id.
110. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
111. Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 E2d 713,716 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Gopman, 531
F2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976); Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 860, n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
112. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
Weighing the needs of efficient judicial administration against the potential advantage of
immediate preventive measures, we believe that unless an attorney's conduct tends to "taint the
underlying trial". . . by [violating Canon 4 or 5], courts should be quite hesitant to disqualify an
attorney. Given the availability of both federal and state comprehensive disciplinary machinery,
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objections would ensure that judicial and litigant resources are not need-
lessly expended on behalf of a litigant who, although able to show that a
lawyer has violated a rule, has suffered no harm. 113 Denial of third party
standing would limit unmerited strategic disqualification motions without
permitting violations by attorneys to go unchecked."f
4
B. Revising Factors Considered in Disqualification Motions
1. Weighing the Harm Caused by Disqualification Against the Harm
Caused by Divulgence of Confidences
In considering disqualification motions, federal courts often fail to even
consider that the possibility of divulged confidences does not produce great
harm in every circumstance. 115 In contrast, the courts have not given
enough weight to the harm inflicted by disqualification of a party's chosen
counsel. 116 The attorney disqualification may cause a party with a mer-
itorious claim or defense to lose a case at trial or to settle on inadequate
terms. 117 Courts that downplay such harms when trying to protect relatively
minor confidential information overlook the possibility of very unjust
results.
2. Greater Consideration Given to the Good Faith of Motions
Courts could give added consideration to whether disqualification mo-
tions have been brought in good faith. A factor in determining good faith is
the timing of a motion. 118 To some extent courts have recognized a variation
- . . there is usually no need to deal with all other kinds of ethical violations in the very litigation
in which they surface.
Id. at 1246.
113. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602,608 (8th Cir. 1977);In re Yarn Processing
Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1976).
114. The violations would be addressed by the appropriate disciplinary body associated with the
jurisdiction's bar association. See Greene, supra note 31, at 215.
115. See supra notes 71-73.
116. A typical remark concerning the hardship to the client is: "[T]he right of the public to counsel
of its choice. . .must be a [secondary consideration] to the paramount importance of maintaining the
highest standards of professional conduct and the scrupulous administration ofjustice." Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d. Cir. 1975).
117. Other hardships to the client rarely considered by the courts include difficulty in finding new
qualified counsel. After its counsel was disqualified in the Westinghouse v. Kerr-McGee litigation,
Westinghouse was turned down by several firms because of the possibility of other conflicts and the
complexity of the case. Additionally, the client must pay for its own staff time to prepare the new
attorneys. Hilliker, Attorney Disqualification Motions, 26 PRAC. LAW. 11, 14 (1980).
118. Comment, Towards a More Balanced Balancing: A Chronological Approach to Attorney
Disqualification for Prior Representation, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 219, 239 (1985).
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of the doctrine of laches in the disqualification context. 119 The threshold
issues are how far into the litigation the movant brought the motion and how
long the movant knew of the possible conflict of interest situation. 120 Once
a reasonable time has passed after a movant was aware of a possible conflict
and circumstances indicate that the movant merely seeks to gain a tactical
advantage rather than eliminate any unfairness at trial, 121 a presumption
favoring the non-movant would shift the emphasis away from protecting the
movant's interests and towards protecting the integrity of the trial pro-
cess. 
12 2
Courts could also more readily ascertain whether the judicial process is
,being subverted by determining whether a party has made a massive
number of frivolous motions for the purposes of delay. 123 If a disqualifica-
tion motion is just the latest in a long line of motions, the court could more
carefully scrutinize the good faith behind the motion. Courts would thereby
lessen tactical abuse of disqualification motions.
C. Greater Use of Sanctions for Bad Faith Motions
Another tool the courts could use to alleviate the problem of burgeoning
disqualification motions is the greater imposition of sanctions. 124 Sanctions
could include awarding attorney's fees for costs of defending a frivolous
motion or for the costs of bringing a motion where a firm knowingly
engaged in a conflict of interest.125 Other possible sanctions include public
censure and disbarment from the court. 126 Sanctions could be imposed for
both blatant conflict of interest violations and the bringing of frivolous
119. See Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F2d 85, 86 (9th Cir. 1983) (movant
knew of possible conflict of interest two-and-one-half years before bringing the disqualification motion;
the court ruled this constituted de facto consent); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F2d 311, 315 (10th Cir.
1975); see also Note, supra note 77, at 740. But see Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng., Inc. v. Humphrey,
722 F.2d 435,438 (9th Cir. 1983) (eight month delay in making the motion was not a waiver ofthe right
to move for disqualification).
120. See Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 E2d 311, 316 (10th Cir. 1975).
121. See Comment, supra note 118, at 239.
122. Certain rights are often lost because a motion was not brought in a timely fashion, including
the right to appeal. This prevents a party from continuing litigation indefinitely. Id. at 240.
123. See the analysis of the delay tactics used by the defendant in United States ex rel. Lord Elec.
Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr., 637 F. Supp. 1556, 1562-63 (W.D. Wash 1986).
124. See Note, Sanctions for Attorney's Representation of Conflicting Interests, 57 CoLuM. L.
REv. 994, 994 (1957).
125. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1270 (7th Cir. 1983).
126. While disqualification itself could be considered a sanction because of the resultant loss of
fees, if the new firm is able to use the work product of the former firm, or the client has agreed to the
representation despite the possible conflict of interest problems, the firm could retain all its fees up to
the actual disqualification.
879
Washington Law Review
disqualification motions. If more attorneys were sanctioned for their dis-
regard of violations of the conflict of interest rules, firms would be less
inclined to attempt the representation or create the situation that caused the
conflict. Additionally, the greater likelihood of sanctions, the less likely
that a party will risk bringing a frivolous disqualification motion. Recently
courts have given real teeth to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by imposing monetary sanctions against attorneys who dis-
regard the integrity of the judicial process by bringing frivolous claims. 127
Rule 11 could be extended to frivolous disqualification motions.
D. Modifying the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
Court approval of new professional responsibility rules which would
better balance the interests of the old and new client would go a long way
toward alleviating the injustices in the present state of attorney disqualifica-
tion motions. Because the federal courts are not bound by the local rules of
the jurisdictions in which they sit, 128 they are free to look beyond the
enacted rules for guidance.
The initial ABA proposal for conflict of interest rules was not nearly as
restrictive as that which was finally adopted. 129 The discussion draft on
vicarious disqualification differed in two ways from the Model Code 130 and
RPC. 131 First, the rules would have allowed courts to inquire not only into
whether matters were substantially related, as in RPC Rule 1.10, but also
whether there was a "risk of disclosing confidences." 132 In addition, the
courts could inquire whether the lawyer "previously participated in a
127. Advance Transformer Co. v. Levinson, No. 79-C-557, slip op. at 8 (N.D. I11. April 3, 1987)
(an attorney and his client were ordered to pay $100,000 each in attorneys fees and costs for a violation
of Rule 11); see also Comment, Ask Questions First and Shoot Later: Constraining Frivolity in
Litigation Under Rule 11, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1267 (1986).
128. See supra note 99.
129. Proposed Rule 7.1 states:
(a) A law firm shall not represent multiple clients when a lawyer practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so.
(b) When lawyers terminate an association in a firm, neither a lawyer remaining in the firm nor
one who has left it, nor any other lawyer with whom either lawyer subsequently becomes
associated, shall undertake representation that involves:
(1) A significant risk of disclosing confidences of a client in violation of Rule 1.7, or making use
of information to the disadvantage of a former client in violation of Rule 1.10; or
(2) A lawyer's assuming significant participation in representing a person in the same or a
substantially related matter if the interest of that person is adverse in any material respect to that of
a client in whose representation the lawyer had previously participated in a significant way.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (Discussion Draft 1980).
130. See supra note 19 for the text of the MODEL CODE provision.
131. See supra note 20.
132. Id.
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significant way" in a substantially related matter. 133 With these two provi-
sions, the courts could more carefully balance the potential harm of
disclosed confidences against the harm created by the disqualification of
counsel. Such balancing would prevent unnecessary harm created by
attorney disqualification where the possibility of the use of client con-
fidences to the client's detriment is minute. 134
E. Recognizing Conflict of Interest Management by the Firm: The
Implementation of Screening Mechanisms
Although changing the disciplinary rules and imposing sanctions upon
attorneys abusing the system by bringing frivolous motioris would solve
many of the problems caused by disqualification motions, realistically such
action is not likely to occur in the immediate future. 135 Since these changes
in the court process have not been made, federal courts have begun to
recognize precautions taken by firms to avoid conflict of interest prob-
lems. 136 The utility of screening as an adequate defense to vicarious
disqualification requires recognition by the federal courts that such action
taken by the firm to insulate itself from liability is effective in preventing
disqualification. Since some courts have begun to recognize protective
measures taken by a firm when evaluating a disqualification motion, it can
be inferred that the greater the measures taken by the firm, the greater the
likelihood that they will be sufficient to overcome the presumption of
disqualification under the present Model Code or RPC. 13
7
Because attorneys change jobs more often, any law firm can assume with
a degree of certainty that it will be faced with a motion to disqualify an
attorney in the firm and subsequent vicarious disqualification of the entire
firm. 138 With this foreknowledge, the managing partners can take action to
133. Id.
134. See Hodes & Gabinet, supra note 81, at 18, col. 1.
135. The courts use sanctions very sparingly, reserving them for only the most serious infractions
of the rules of professional responsibility. See generally ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSiONAL Disci'LnE &
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBIuTY, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE To LAWYER MIScoNDuCr IV.8-.9
(1984).
136. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 81-1379 slip op. at 7 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1982); Armstrong
v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
137. Several courts have, after disqualifying a firm, noted in dicta that they would consider
preventative measures if the firms could show they had taken them. See Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d
1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1985) (vicarious disqualification of a firm granted because there was no screening
in place); Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng., Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 437-438 (9th Cir. 1983)
(mentions Chinese Walls in dicta but because no screening mechanisms were in place makes no ruling;
disqualifies firm); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417,421 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle NatlBank v. County
of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 259 (7th Cir. 1983).
138. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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prevent the imposition of vicarious disqualification. The motive for acting
to prevent future disqualifications is monetary. If the firm is disqualified, it
may not receive the fees the case would have generated and may not be paid
for the work that it has already done. 139 By changing the way a firm handles
client confidences and privileges in a way which courts will recognize as
effective against disqualification motions, the managing partners can pre-
vent what could be a sizable financial loss and malpractice liability. 140
1. Screening Mechanisms as a Defense Against Vicarious
Disqualification
The first step in the prevention of disqualification is the institution of
systems from simple card indexes' 4' to complex computer programs 142 that
allow the firm to check new clients and new personnel for potential conflicts
of interest. The theory behind these systems is that most conflict of interest
problems can be avoided if potential clients or employees are scrutinized
carefully. There will be times, however, when it is in the firm's best interest
that someone be hired who may cause a conflict of interest problem, or
when a conflict of interest is not discovered until considerable work has
been done on a case. In such circumstances, the best way the firm can avoid
being disqualified is to have in place mechanisms designed to protect client
confidentiality. 143
a. Chinese Walls: Screening Mechanisms Around Departments
As a means to eliminate the potential for the sharing of confidences law
firms could implement "Chinese Walls" similar to those which originated
in investment banking firms. The wall is erected to restrict information flow
to specific departments. 144 In investment firms, departmentalization begins
139. See Note, supra note 77, at 739.
140. According to professional liability insurers, conflict of interest cases constituted less than five
percent in 1977 compared with twenty-two percent in 1979. Stern & Martin, Mitigating the Risk of
Becoming a Defendant in a Malpractice Action by Your Former Client, 39 ALA. LAW. 258, 260 (1978).
141. Wilson, Conflict of Interest Problems and Solutions, 5 LEGAL ADMIN., Fall 1986, at 29-32.
142. Alder, Beyond Chinese Walls: Coping with Conflicts, AM. LAw., May 1984, at 6, 8.
143. Many commentators have noted that although by no means a panacea for the many ethical
problems presented by contemporary legal practice, the Chinese Wall defense in some cases can rebut
the presumption of imputed knowledge and thereby save a law firm from disqualification. It is also
asserted Chinese Walls are capable of effectively preventing the disclosure and misuse of confidential
information within law firms. See Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 714 (1980).
144. In investment banking firms, a potential conflict of interest arises when one division is getting
together the financing of a takeover bid and another division is instructing clients where to invest their
money in the stock market. Obviously, if the advisors were to learn of the pending takeover of a
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with the division of labor into discrete departments. Organizational separa-
tion is supplemented by physical separation to increase the sense of
departmental identity. 145 In addition, a strong policy statement from the
management against passing information to other departments, accom-
panied by an educational program for employees, is essential if a Chinese
Wall is to be recognized as effective. 146
b. Strict Firm Policies To Ensure Screening
In conjunction with screening mechanisms, in order to ensure that
attorneys do not receive confidential information despite departmentaliza-
tion, firms must adopt strict policies against sharing confidences. 147 Com-
panies whose major assets are trade secrets seek to protect these secrets
from competitors by limiting access to information and imposing penalties
against employees who reveal trade secrets. 148 The courts in the trade
secrets cases, 149 like the courts deciding the disqualification cases, pre-
sume that the free flow of information is not regulated by the company. 150
To rebut this presumption the company must show that it has a written
policy which is strictly enforced. 151
As with a high-tech firm protecting against divulgence of trade secrets, a
firm trying to protect itself from vicarious disqualification can begin with a
written firm-wide policy on information handling. The policy must include
sanctions that will be imposed, including dismissal, against attorneys, or
particular company and advised their clients to buy the stock of that company, they would violate the
Security and Exchange Commission's prohibitions against insider trading. So that these investment
banking firms can continue to perform both functions, the firms instituted Chinese Walls between the
divisions of the firm to prevent such insider information leaks. Id. at 705-06.
145. Id.
146. Herzel & Colling, The Chinese Wall and Conflicts of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAw. 73, 88,
89 (1978).
147. Marx & Manela, Protecting Confidential Information in High-Tech Companies, 31 PERSON-
NELADMIN., May 1986, at 35-44; Sack, You Can KeepA Secret, 134 SALES & MARKETING MoMT., Feb.
4, 1985, at 39-41.
148. See Marx & Manela, Protecting Vital Trade Secrets, 75 MGMT. REv., Feb. 1986, at 46-47;
Marx & Manela, supra note 147; Sack, supra note 147; The Law: Keeping Secrets, 7 INc., June 1985, at
120.
149. Trade secret cases typically involve not products or processes but ideas involving uses of
products and processes. In order to hold an employee liable for damages created by the divulgence of a
trade secret, the employee must have known that the information was confidential. Marx & Manela,
supra note 148.
150. Cf. Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F Supp. 1043, 1059 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Kaufman v. International Business Mach. Corp., 470 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (1983).
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text; see also Spanner, Protecting Innovation: How
Much Trade Secret Security is Enough?, Bus. MARKETNG, Oct. 1984, at 70-90. Secrecy did not even
have an independent existence; information was secret "only to the extent that those who possess it
choose to treat it so." Spanner, supra, at 70 (quoting an unnamed Michigan court).
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other persons, who violate the confidentiality policy. New attorneys and
staff must be informed of the firm's strict policies regarding access to client
confidences. 152 These measures would provide a firm foundation for argu-
ing to the court that vicarious disqualification is unwarranted. 153
c. Mechanisms To Assure Effectiveness of Chinese Walls
To minimize the problem of potential vicarious disqualification of a
firm's entire litigation department, if any member thereof is disqualified,
litigation teams could be formed. The formation of teams for litigation has
already been initiated in many firms to promote efficiency. 154 These firms
could institute a strict policy against sharing confidential information with
non-team members. An attorney joining a firm after working for an oppos-
ing firm would be segregated from the team which is working on the
litigation in the new firm.
So that communication between firm members who seek advice on a
specific legal question outside their "team" could be continued, an ap-
proach similar to that taken by doctors who wish to protect patient con-
fidentially while consulting with a specialist could be adopted. 155 Courts
have recognized that no client confidences are passed when the attorney
consults a co-worker on a specific legal question. 156
To augment the policies against disclosure of confidential information,
litigation files could be locked and access to files limited to specific
department or "team" members. 157 Memos and other materials containing
client confidences or litigation strategy could be marked to alert every
employee of their status. 158 In the case of extremely sensitive documents,
special paper could be obtained which cannot be photocopied. 59 Similar
152. Marx & Manela, supra note 148.
153. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
154. Billard, The Jones, Day Guide to Law Firm Autocracy, 8 AM. LAW., April 1986, at 109, 111.
155. A doctor during such consultations does not specifically identify the patient but addresses
only that aspect of the patient's condition applicable to the consultation.
156. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
[T]here is reason to differentiate for disqualification purposes between lawyers who become
heavily involved in the facts of a particular matter and those who enter briefly on the periphery for a
limited and specific purpose relating solely to legal questions. In large firms at least, the former are
normally more seasoned lawyers and the latter the more junior.
Id. at 756-57.
157. Marx & Manela, supra note 148.
158. Suggested markings include actually placing the names of the team members on the document
or stating that the document is only to be discussed with the person from whom it was received. Id. at
49.
159. See Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (on the
importance of such measures in a suit alleging misappropriated trade secrets).
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security measures could be employed to protect documents within the
firm's data processing system. 160
Although the firms most likely to be able to take advantage of the
screening mechanisms are large and already partially departmentalized, 161
small firms that hire "of counsel" or "contract" attorneys can use screen-
ing mechanisms to limit their exposure to conflict of interest problems. 162
Implementing policies which essentially make the potentially conflicted
attorney a separate department handling discrete matters would create a
basis for arguing against vicarious disqualification of the entire firm. 163
The facts that present the best argument for the screening mechanism
defense to disqualification involve double imputations. If an attorney is first
imputed to have received confidences and then this imputed knowledge is
imputed to the other members of his firm, possible detriment to the former
client has reached its most attenuated state. 164 There clearly are cases,
however, where Chinese Walls are not an appropriate means to prevent
disqualification, i.e. concurrent representation of adversaries. 165 Addi-
tionally, even with efficient screening mechanisms established within a
firm, individual attorneys have an ethical duty to avoid representation of a
client if such representation results in a scenario whereby an inadvertent
disclosure would be extremely harmful to an adversary/former client. 166
160. See Spanner, supra note 151, at 89 (precautions include using software "keys" and data
encryption or putting "fuses" into software that detect unauthorized access and stop or erase a program
if unauthorized access occurs).
161. "The risk of conflict rises exponentially with the size of the firm. "G. IAzARD, ETmics
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 81 (1978).
162. See, e.g., United States exrel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr., 637 F Supp. 1556 (W.D.
Wash. 1986). In considering the disqualification motions, the court looked at the nature of the former
representation, the time elapsed since that representation, the nature of the conflicted attorney's
association with the present firm (including work assignments and salary arrangements), the likelihood
of contact with the litigation attorneys and the presence and efficiency of "specific institutional
mechanisms." Id. at 1565-66.
163. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr., 637 F Supp. 1556, 1559
(W.D. Wash. 1986) (the conflict involved an "of counsel" attorney who was not active in the litigation
portion of the firm; vicarious disqualification was denied).
164. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr., 637 F Supp. 1556, 1565 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
165. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
166. See generally Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807, 843-48 (1977); Com-
ment, Disqualification of Counsel: Adverse Interests and Revolving Doors, 81 CoLum. L. REv. 199,
212-16 (1981).
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2. Assessing Whether Attorneys Have Received and Shared Client
Confidences
In the past the courts have given billable hours no weight in determining
whether confidential information was received or shared by attorneys in a
firm. 167 The courts reasoned that although an attorney may never have
actually billed the client for work on a particular matter, the attorney could
easily have learned the client's confidences and secrets. 168 If the firm's
management has initiated a strict system of screening mechanisms
whereby information is shared only within the "team" or department, the
courts may be more likely to give credence to records of hours billed on a
matter. 169
The institution of departmentalization, with or without the limitation of
the team concept, will restrict the free flow of ideas and information
presently enjoyed in most firms. In firms with little exposure to dis-
qualification motions, the loss of informal information sharing may not be
worth the protection afforded by the screening mechanisms. However, in
firms that are large, 170 are likely to merge with another firm, or hire a
considerable number of experienced attorneys, screening mechanisms may
offer a means to prevent both future disqualification and to avoid restric-
tions on what clients the firm can represent. 171
IV. CONCLUSION
The number of disqualification motions will continue to grow because
the underlying conditions causing this growth are unlikely to change.
Nearly every firm will be faced with an attorney disqualification motion
167. See, e.g., EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The court concluded
that despite affidavits showing that no hours had been billed to the client, the party defending against the
disqualification motion had not "clearly and effectively" rebutted the presumption that the conflicted
attorneys "have knowledge of the confidences of EZ Paintr." Id. at 1462.
168. Consideration was even given whether members of a firm "regularly had lunch together...
at least once a month." Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
169. Presently consideration of hours billed is only given as a reason to disqualify an attorney and
submit the firm to vicarious disqualification. Credence is given billable hours to show an attorney must
have received confidences, but lack of billable hours cannot rebut the presumption of shared con-
fidences. See supra note 167.
170. See supra note 84.
171. An additional advantage to firms that limit the exposure ofa client's secrets and confidences is
that they may obtain greater client trust. If the client knows that information given his attorney will not
be relayed to persons not working on his case, he may feel freer to reveal sensitive information. When a
client deals with a small firm, the client can assume that his confidences are shared by a relatively small
number of people. A client may not, however, feel comfortable giving a large number of attorneys and
support personnel access to confidences of a sensitive nature.
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because of its extensive use as a trial tactic. By establishing screening
mechanisms against sharing confidential information, firms can limit the
impact of future disqualification motions based on conflicts of interest.
Courts have already approved mechanisms for preventing the spread of
information in the trade secrets area. Federal courts appear willing to
extend approval of these mechanisms in the future to the conflicts of interest
setting. This approval would signal recognition of the burdens of dis-
qualification and the hardship created by irrebuttable presumptions in the
context of vicarious disqualification. By using the methods suggested here
to protect client confidences, laws firms can take positive prophylactic
action that may prevent future disqualification.
Linda Ann Winslow
